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Abstract: Electoral coordination is central to the creation of national party systems under first-
past-the-post rules, but there are instances where we see such coordination fail even at the district 
level. In this paper we argue that electoral coordination requires the control of patronage 
distribution by local bureaucracies. Electoral districts in which bureaucrats do not hold a 
monopoly over the distribution of patronage, major political parties cannot monopolize 
competition among themselves, leading to the persistence of local champions as viable 
candidates and electoral fragmentation. In districts in which the bureaucracy controls patronage 
we see coordination yielding Duvergerian equilibria. We formulate and test this argument 
through constituency- and precinct-level analysis of Pakistani elections, and additional evidence 
from Indian elections. 
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Elections in democracies represent a discrete choice for voters among a limited number of 
credible alternatives for office. In single-member plurality (SMP) systems, there are mechanisms 
that limit real competition to two credible candidates who receive most of the votes in a 
constituency, or what Duverger called “local bipartyism.”1 As parties field candidates across 
constituencies to capture enough seats to form the government, the competition between parties 
in each constituency is aggregated to produce a national party system. Maximizing the chances 
that voters’ preferences are transmitted to the shape and direction of the government depends 
crucially on these mechanisms, together known as electoral coordination.2  
The capacities of parties to coordinate their electoral strategies across constituencies can 
certainly vary. As Chhibber and Kollman have shown, candidates coordinate across districts 
through common party affiliation, but sometimes that coordination is limited to particular 
regions within a country.3 This can lead to a fragmented national party system that is still 
consistent with the convergent dynamics of local bipartyism, as recent elections in Canada, India 
and the United Kingdom have demonstrated.  
 Yet coordination can be absent even within a district, yielding the much more 
theoretically confounding outcome of constituency-level electoral fragmentation. In such cases, 
the mechanism of strategic entry by major parties fails to produce a list of credible, party-
affiliated candidates, and the mechanism of strategic voting fails to select from this list the two 
(or at most three) parties most likely to prevail in a constituency election. Multiple candidates – 
including those unaffiliated with major parties – stay viable in the race and the successful 
candidate wins with a small plurality of the overall vote. What might prevent voters from 
consolidating their support around two or three party-affiliated competitors within a 
constituency? 
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In this article, we argue that the control of patronage by politicians can fashion the 
possibilities for electoral convergence. More broadly, fragmentation can occur when national and 
powerful regional parties are collectively unable to establish an exclusive arena of competition 
that drives out other contenders, and thus restricting the field of credible candidates for office to 
those affiliated with those parties. We contend that the potential power for office-holding 
aspirants to determine the distribution of politically salient goods and services through leverage 
over bureaucratic agents is critical for establishing the hegemony of party competition and 
convergence around a few candidates within a constituency.4  
If candidates lack the capability to return favors to their supporters through directing 
bureaucrats to disburse patronage in this manner, the in-built advantages of major party 
affiliation, and thus a key mechanism for constituency-level convergence, disappear. The 
effectiveness of competition between major parties at constituency level thus requires the control 
of an effective bureaucratic apparatus with the authority to distribute patronage at that level, 
because parties can exert influence on bureaucrats in ways that unaffiliated candidates cannot. If 
there are alternative channels for the distribution of public resources in a constituency – ones that 
statutorily bypass bureaucrats – multiple ‘local champions’ can remain credible and voters are 
left with few signals as to which two or three candidates are most likely to win, resulting in 
fragmented constituency-level competition. 
We demonstrate these dynamics through a within-case study of democratic national 
elections in Pakistan in 2008 and 2013. The average Pakistani constituency in these elections had 
an effective number of parties (ENP) of 2.7 and 3.1 respectively, fully consistent with theoretical 
expectations. But there are significant outliers. Specifically, we see substantially higher 
fragmentation and lower proportion of the vote for major parties in the Federally Administered 
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Tribal Areas (FATA) and Balochistan on the country’s northwestern and western peripheries. In 
these areas, enduring legacies of colonial rule have persisted in the form of quasi-formal 
institutions of “sub-contracted governance,” in which the central government distributes 
patronage resources to the population through customary tribal leadership rather than a regular 
bureaucracy. The statutory inability of a quotidian bureaucracy to distribute patronage at the 
local level allows electoral fragmentation because parties are unable to monopolize influence 
over the distribution of that patronage. We additionally show these dynamics in play at the 
constituency level in India, in the spatial variation of local state presence and the extent of 
electoral coordination in several parliamentary constituencies.  
This article contributes several key insights to our understanding of the nature of 
democratic competition in developing countries. First, it provides a new explanation for failures 
in electoral coordination both within and across electoral districts. The literature on electoral 
politics posits that four major factors impact electoral coordination: 1) majoritarian electoral 
institutions create incentives for voters and candidates to coordinate with parties within 
constituencies; 2) cleavages can define the substance of disagreements that generate party 
competition and even shape the party system; 3) federalism and the concentration of executive 
power can limit or enable parties to coordinate across constituencies; and 4) the organizational 
effectiveness of parties might affect their cababilities to enable coordination.5 The first three of 
these factors are, however, national attributes, and thus unable to account for variations within 
national cases; the last has a hard time accounting for this kind of variation, as the same parties 
are able to coordinate in some areas and fail to do so in others. By contrast, this article provides a 
framework that explains why convergent party competition might be present in some 
constituencies and absent in others. 
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Second, while much has been written on how democracy can transform the state, there is 
comparatively little systematic study of the ways in which the state as a set of institutions – and 
particularly the unevenness in the operation of these institutions at the local level across national 
territories – might shape the nature and limits of democratic competition. Research on the state in 
developing countries has highlighted the ways in which state-building created legacies of 
geographic variation in the government’s authority and discrete, heterodox arrangements 
between the government and powerful actors in society. This article deploys some of these 
insights to help us understand puzzles of variation in electoral coordination across constituencies, 
and how the nature of state institutions are important for understanding the linkage between 
votes and representation.  
Third, this article highlights the potential utility of analyzing the dynamics of cases, such 
as Pakistan, not normally associated with theory generation in electoral politics. In so doing, it 
can help us understand the nature and contexts of democratic competition that lie at some 
remove from the wealthy institutionalized democracies, from which most of our theories of 
electoral politics arise. While the dynamics discussed here are specific to countries in which 
there is variation in the de facto or even de jure character and role of the local bureaucracies, this 
limiting condition might still apply to parliamentary democracies with some form of majoritarian 
representation in the developing world. More broadly, however, the article highlights the 
importance of particular aspects of the state as usually assumed but vitally important in the 
operation of democratic competition.   
The next section lays out the theoretical framework that links electoral coordination and 
fragmentation at the constituency level to the nature of the state through the structure of 
patronage politics. Section three lays out the mechanisms and provides evidence with regard to 
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variation in electoral coordination in Pakistan; section four extends the analysis beyond the 
Pakistani case, with some evidence on variation in state presence and fragmentation in Indian 
elections. The conclusion discusses the implications of this argument to theories of democratic 
politics and the bureaucratic state.  
   
Electoral Coordination, Bureaucracy and Patronage Politics 
 
The Mechanisms of Electoral Coordination 
 
Why do constituency-level elections in SMP systems tend towards convergent competition 
around a small number of candidates? Two distinct mechanisms are key to explaining how 
voters’ preferences are translated into convergence in competition. The first and most well-
known is that electoral rules create incentives for individual voters, which in turn leads to 
electoral competition among a limited number of parties.  
Duverger’s Law posits that in elections held under first-past-the-post rules, the effective 
number of parties should be two: “the true effect of the simple-majority system is limited to local 
bipartyism… the creation of a two-party system in the individual constituency.”6 Duverger's Law 
assumes that that there exists a nontrivial amount of strategic voting in constituency-level 
elections.7 Following a standard definition of strategic voting – voters prefer not to waste their 
votes if meaningful and potentially consequential votes can be cast – its implication in SMP 
elections is that voters prefer to vote for a candidate that has a chance of winning the election, all 
else being equal. A voter may prefer party A over party B and party B over party C, but she still 
may vote for party B if party A has virtually no chance of winning. Voting is thus ‘strategic’ in 
the sense that voters do not base their decisions solely on their preference rankings, but choose 
based on a combination of their preference rankings and assessments of how their behavior will 
best affect the election outcome and thus their wellbeing. If voters are rational, then they will 
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take into account the likelihood that their votes will help decide election outcomes. Cox proves 
that under one equilibrium scenario, which he names a “Duvergerian” outcome, for n seats 
chosen from the electoral district, n+1 parties will receive votes and the remainder of the 
candidates will receive zero votes.8 Candidates expected to finish below “first loser” position 
will not receive any votes from rational citizens.   
One potential explanation for a higher number of parties is an application of Cox’s model 
consistent with Duvergerian logic. In his model, there is the possibility of a tie between the 
second- and third-place parties. If voters and candidates within a district dislike the frontrunner 
party and want to defeat it, but cannot come to a workable agreement on which candidate or 
party should be the challenger, then it is possible for those voters to act strategically and yet end 
up dividing their vote evenly, ending up with a ‘non-Duvergerian’ equilibrium of three parties 
contending seriously for the vote, with any candidates below second loser position will receive 
no votes.  
 A second important mechanism, “strategic entry” and candidate selection, precedes 
strategic voting.9 Parties choose to compete in some constituencies and not others, and they do so 
by putting forward candidates that could viably compete under the party’s banner at the 
constituency level. Candidate selection by parties competing in a constituency winnows the field: 
two potential candidates for a party’s ticket cannot both run as candidates of that party, once the 
primary or selection panel is held. Party entry and candidate selection also enables strategic 
voting by providing voters with valuable information on the relative standing of candidates based 
on their party affiliation.  
The formation of modern, national party systems as a whole has involved a transition in 
the nature of parties from a group of elites coming together for electoral and legislative 
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coordination to parties organized by the articulation of broader interests in society – of business, 
or labor.10 Max Weber characterized early parties as “rule by the clique,” and argued that these 
would be broken by the emergence of machines and political operatives with “vocational” 
motivations.11 The development of party democracy in Europe and the Americas involved a 
transition from cliques to mass membership and then “catch-all” parties, increasing the power of 
party organizations relative to individual candidates.12  
 Present-day competition between parties has arisen in part out of social cleavages around 
which political conflict is structured. Lipset and Rokkan argued that cleavages produce parties 
representing opposing sides; the party system produced by these cleavages at the advent of 
democratic competition is then institutionalized and thus ‘frozen.’13 The extent of polarization 
between such groups influence voter preferences and can even determine the character of 
political institutions, and even electoral systems in extreme cases.14 Chandra explained the rise of 
the Bahujan Samaj Party and the fragmentation of the party system in Uttar Pradesh through the 
mobilization and representation of a previously excluded group.15 Stoll has argued more broadly 
that groups with rising social and political salience, when entering a polity with significant levels 
of decentralized authority, can significantly influence the number of parties.16 Parties and party 
systems, then, reflect broader national or regional sets of issues and concerns that tie together the 
specificities of competition between candidates at the local level to competition over the control 
of the state among national and major regional parties driven by broader issues, cleavages and 
conflicts.  
 The contention of this article is, however, that where there is no durable link between 
constituency-level contests and broader regional or national competition – where national party 
competition has not monopolized local contests – fragmentation can occur because candidates 
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without major party affiliation do not drop out of the race and voters lack the information 
necessary to rank-order candidates in terms of viability. In these cases, in other words, credible 
candidates are not (only) those who represent national or major regional political concerns. What 
might break such a connection? 
Electoral Coordination and Patronage Politics 
 
In order to understand what might prevent national or regional political parties from 
monopolizing competition, we introduce a complementary mechanism for electoral coordination 
around a small number of national candidates at the constituency level: that of patronage.17 
Patronage is a central concept in electoral politics. Politicians seek votes from those in the 
electorate by promising the delivery of particular, discretionary goods and services, and voters 
can seek to punish politicians for their failure in providing them by voting for their opponents. 
The perceived ability to effectively deliver patronage goods might drive voters’ preferences 
toward certain parties, and thus establish the preference ordering implicit in strategic voting. 
Scholars have located deep relationships between patronage and the character of electoral 
competition.18 Some of the most established theoretical work on this relationship focused on 
patronage-producing ‘machine’ politics in American and European cities, which yielded one 
party dominance.19 Yet high levels of patronage provision are consistent with vigorous electoral 
competition in many developing country democracies, especially in South Asia.20 
How might patronage enable electoral coordination within and across constituencies, 
leading to convergence toward national party systems? Medina and Stokes have posited that 
patronage involves ‘political monopolies’ over relevant patronage goods and services, which are 
controlled only when in office.21 Implicit in their model is the notion that bureaucrats act as 
perfect agents for politicians in the delivery of these goods and services. But it is unlikely that a 
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single politician by herself would have the requisite influence to order bureaucrats to do her 
bidding. This is especially true in contexts where junior bureaucrats are hired, promoted and 
transferred by their superiors, rather than through the spoils system.22 
 In this context, political aspirants must achieve and maintain leverage over local 
bureaucrats to credibly claim influence over the distribution of patronage. This leverage must 
ultimately come from above: orders to local bureaucrats from their superiors in national and 
provincial capitals. In order to secure such leverage, politicians must have vertical linkages to 
ministers and party elders who can issue directives to or otherwise have influence over senior 
bureaucrats. These linkages are normally possible only when aspirants run on national or major 
regional party tickets, and thus are part of a common effort to secure majority coalitions. Thus 
politicians, in order to secure bureaucrats’ support in the execution of patronage, must affiliate 
with parties with a credible chance of entering government, either with a majority or as part of a 
coalition. This logic reflects Cox and McCubbins’ concept of legislative cartels, in which 
politicians join parties to climb up organizational ladders and because parties aid in electoral 
mobilization at the constituency level.23 Jensenius has found empirical evidence of the need for 
party affiliation in India; politicians cannot credibly deliver patronage unless they are part of the 
government.24 
Thus, a dominant form of political mobilization and competition involves managing 
hierarchical relationships within parties in order to direct bureaucrats to effectively deliver goods 
at the local level. A constituency-level candidate and a party boss need one another; the latter 
needs to win seats in order to maximize their chances of forming the government, and the former 
needs to signal at least perceived access to the state’s distribution of resources. This nexus is 
likely to displace independent contenders for office, because independents cannot normally claim 
	   10	  
as much access to influence over patronage distribution. It might invite competition from other 
parties with similar credibility in terms of influencing the bureaucracy, however. In this way, 
promises of patronage distribution can limit credible competition to candidates affiliated to major 
parties.  
Sub-Contracted Governance, Alternative Patronage Distribution and Electoral Fragmentation 
 
A key, but often implicit, assumption in the basic model of patron-client exchange in electoral 
politics is that elected patrons have the capabilities – the requisite resources and the authority to 
distribute them – to direct patronage to their clients. As argued above, individual politicians may 
not have such authority, but their superiors within legislative cartels should, thus yielding the 
effectiveness of competition between major parties at the local level. But the power of party-
affiliated candidates, through relationships with ministers and party bosses, is predicated on the 
monopoly of the distribution of these goods and services by local bureaucrats susceptible to such 
influence. Such a monopoly accords with our expectations, following Weber, that the state 
controls key activities in political life and bureaucrats are its salaried agents, without access to 
independent means of coercion, legitimacy or authority.25 Given the unique power of the state to 
deploy coercion and distribute its vast resources, it is no wonder that parties would compete over 
its control through electoral contests. 
 In much of the developing world, however, the state’s authority over coercion and 
distribution varies significantly over national territory. Herbst argued that governments’ 
influence in sub-Saharan Africa is limited to major cities and international borders.26 Boone 
framed ‘topographies’ of the African state through different engagements between state-builders 
and social elites.27 Scott explored strategies of different groups that successfully resist 
governments’ monopolizing control.28 Naseemullah and Staniland argued that contemporary 
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variation in conflict and development may be a legacy of different institutions of colonial 
governance.29 Variation in the forms of governance means that in some areas, local bureaucrats 
have the statutory authority and administrative resources to monopolize the distribution of public 
resources. In others, the government have used alternative channels for the distribution of 
resources that effectively bypasses or precludes Weberian bureaucracy. These might include the 
incorporation of figures of customary authority to perform the government’s key responsibilities 
in the distribution of resources at the local level, or what we call “subcontracted governance.” 
 Much of the literature on non-state actors conducting governance functions has been 
framed in the context of “rebel governance,” with groups seeking to supplant the authority of the 
sovereign state.30 More recently, there have been debates about whether the provision of key 
public and social goods and services by non-state actors may actually be mediating or enhancing 
state authority, as with the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and NGOs in Kenya.31 Kate Baldwin 
has recently written of how traditional chiefs in Sub-Saharan Africa, as notables with political 
influence, can press the state to be more responsive to client populations.32 But this article draws 
a distinction between traditional authorities influencing or strengthening governments’ 
effectiveness from privileged positions as civil society actors, and traditional authorities being 
formally incorporated into the governance systems emanating from the state, as Catherine Boone 
has suggested in analyzing the relationship between rural chieftaincy and the administration of 
collective land rights in African countries.33 
 Such subcontracted governance, and its impact on alternative mechanisms for patronage 
distribution, has a significant impact on how we think about electoral coordination and 
convergent mechanisms. Absent quotidian administrative monopolies over patronage 
distribution, calls to party headquarters will not yield influence over such distribution. Thus 
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affiliation with major parties does not provide the overwhelming advantage in electoral 
competition that is present elsewhere. Instead, party-affiliated candidates may have to compete 
on a relatively more level playing-field with “local champions:” independent candidates or those 
affiliated with minor parties who have achieved loyalty and support from a large enough sub-
section of the local electorate to be taken seriously as a contender for office.  
In this context, a number of factors produce constituency-level fragmentation. Party 
selection mechanisms fail because major party-affiliated candidates cannot credibly claim special 
authority over patronage distribution, and thus are not particularly competitive compared to other 
candidates. Local champions stand a credible chance of winning and rewarding their supporters 
with minimal benefits of office, so they remain in the race. Voters lack the usual information 
necessary to rank-order party-affiliated candidates in terms of viability, and thus strategic voting 
becomes difficult; voters are thus more likely to vote for their most local candidate in the hopes 
of getting goods from office if elected, instead of converging on two or three most favored 
candidates. In the next sections, we will show some evidence of this variation. 
 
Electoral Convergence and Fragmentation in Pakistani Elections 
 
Democracy in Pakistan has been halting, but representative structures and organizations are not 
new. Pakistan’s first ‘constitution,’ the Government of India Act, 1935, established electoral 
rolls, geographically delimited single-member constituencies, reserved seats for minorities and 
victory to the candidate with the largest number of votes per constituency.34 These rules were 
affirmed by the 1973 Constitution, which established direct elections to non-reserved seats in the 
national and provincial assemblies.35 This constitution and these electoral rules have been in 
place over eight general elections. 
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Pakistan also has a long-established tradition of political parties. The All-India Muslim 
League, led by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, was responsible for the demand for Pakistan as a state for 
Indian Muslims.36 Various factions of the Muslim League dominated Pakistan’s early electoral 
politics, absorbing regional political groups.37 Throughout Pakistan’s post-independence history, 
powerful national and regional parties have been formed and institutionalized in response to 
military rule, political opportunity and regional assertion, including the Pakistan People’s Party 
(PPP), Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q), 
the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaaf (PTI), Awami National Party (ANP), Muttahida Qaumi Movement 
(MQM), the Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) and the Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI). Each of these parties has 
compete regularly in elections and entered and left office at provincial, national and municipal 
levels. 
 
Party System Convergence? 
 
Even though party positions at the national level shifted dramatically between the 2008 and the 
2013 elections, district-level party systems have remained largely unchanged, with only a small 
average increase of effective parties.38 The most startling characteristic of that party system, 
demonstrated across two elections, is significant variation in the number of parties at the 
constituency level. Figure 1 demonstrates substantial variation around a mode of two expected 
parties, which only increases in the 2013 elections. 
Figure 1: Effective Number of Parties in National Assembly Elections, 2008 and 3013 
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This variation is regionally concentrated. Constituencies in the more populous provinces 
of Punjab and Sindh have effective parties averaging 2.7 and 2.4 respectively in 2013, whereas in 
Balochistan and FATA, ENP averaged 4.5 and 6.2. Why might this be the case, given that the 
same electoral rules are in operation throughout Pakistan and social cleavages do not usually cut 
across ethnically homogeneous constituencies? We argue that the ways in which different parts 
of Pakistan are governed and patronage is distributed can have a defining impact on electoral 
convergence or fragmentation. 
In the populous eastern provinces of Pakistan, there is a durable link between 
constituency-level competition and the national and regional struggles for domination by major 
parties. In Punjab since the 1990s, vigorous electoral competition has become institutionalized 
between the PML-N and other challengers, previously the PPP and more recently the PML-Q 
and then the PTI. Andrew Wilder has argued that strategies of electoral mobilization by parties in 
Punjab have crosscut and diminished old structures of authority, such as locally dominant 
endogamous groups (biradaris), by parties nominating candidates from the same biradari in local 
contests.39 Shandana Mohmand has emphasized the link between patronage, brokers and 
electoral support for candidates in parliamentary elections.40 In Sindh, there is less competition 
than in Punjab; the PPP dominates towns and rural areas of the province and the MQM controls 
the cities of Hyderabad and Karachi. Yet even in this less competitive environment, mobilizing 
the state at the local level to deliver patronage goods – including security – are important 
elements of both parties’ electoral mobilization strategies.41  
Electoral outcomes in Punjab and Sindh show a preponderance of Duvergerian equilibria 
and suggesting that in a plurality of these constituencies, two parties compete effectively. 
Examining the ratio of the proportion of votes for the third place candidate (second loser) to 
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those of the second place candidate (first loser), what Cox has termed the ‘SF’ ratio, we see 
modal peaks of 35.27 percent and 31.8 percent of constituencies between 0 and 0.2, in the 2008 
and 2013 elections respectively. Further, in most constituencies, these candidates were affiliated 
with major parties: candidates from parties of national standing42 captured, on average, 80 
percent and 73 percent of the vote across Punjabi and Sindhi constituencies respectively in the 
2013 elections.  
In Khyber Pakhtunhwa (KP), the northwestern province bordering the tribal agencies and 
in which Pakhtun tribal identity remains strong, cycles of anti-incumbency have made strategic 
voting more challenging. This has contributed to a higher ENP – 4.13 on average in 2013. Yet 
constituency-level competition is among candidates from major parties: parties of national 
standing account for 85 percent average vote share for KP constituencies in the 2013 elections, in 
contrast to 36 percent for FATA constituencies. The features of electoral politics in Punjab, 
Sindh, and even KP suggest that candidate selection and strategic voting are creating electoral 
convergence and that competition between major parties has become localized, marginalizing 
those without party affiliation. The signal importance of the state in the provision of patronage 
resources in these regions has meant that parties aim to win seats and form governments in order 
to direct it.  
Sub-Contracted Governance and Electoral Fragmentation in Pakistan’s Peripheries 
 
Two regions in the country’s west and northwest maintain state-society relations under which the 
tribal leadership distributes goods and services and executes policy on behalf of the federal 
government.43 In FATA, tribal maliks maintain administrative and judicial authority within their 
tribal jurisdictions, in coordination with political agents acting as sole representatives of the 
central state.44 Administrative exceptionalism is supported by a legal framework – the Frontier 
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Crimes Legislation of 1901 – elements of which were integrated into Pakistan’s 1973 
Constitution: provincial assemblies and superior courts have no jurisdiction there.45 While the 
central government provides FATA with developmental and administrative resources, these 
resources are not distributed through government servants; political agents maintain only small 
numbers of support staff and have been traditionally thought of as diplomats or representatives of 
the government rather than administrators. Rather, resources are effectively provided to the tribal 
leadership for distribution, which is responsible for providing the manpower and the logistics to 
distribute resources and execute government projects, like building roads or schools or 
maintaining militias to preserving public order. 
 Balochistan is a more intermediate case. It has a provincial government and a regular, if 
weak, bureaucracy. The capital, Quetta, is dominated by a major military base and is thus a 
regional center of state power. The influence of this regularly governed administrative state 
reaches the urban population in Quetta and other cities, representing around a quarter of the 
province’s population. In the vast rural hinterland classified ‘Area B’ by the federal government, 
however, law and order is statutorily administered by the Balochistan Levies, recruited from and 
maintained by tribal groups, providing Balochi tribal leaders or sardars with authority normally 
reserved for the state and thus maintain significant influence over its functions at the local level, 
including the distribution of resources.46  
In these areas, customary leadership essentially controls the actual distribution of 
patronage. A government committee assessing governance in FATA stated that “maliks…assist 
in the implementation of government’s policies by acting as intermediaries between the members 
of individual tribes and the government. They are expected to maintain peace and ensure that 
roads in the region remain open.”47 A former political agent with decades of experience in FATA 
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said, “there is no chance in hell to affect change without the agreement of tribal maliks or leaders 
in that area.”48  
The political calculations of tribal leaders are nuanced, reflecting informal yet durable 
compacts between elites and the tribal population: “patronage has to be balanced with the tribal 
requirements. There is a balance – in the pashtunwali [tribal honor system] context, you will not 
last long as a malik or influential individual if you do not look after the general welfare of the 
tribe and the clan.”49 Maliks in FATA thus do not just have the authority but also the imperative 
to distribute patronage. In Balochistan, while the tribal system is more hierarchical than in 
FATA, there is still an expectation that effective sardars speak on behalf of their communities to 
the government and have influence over the distribution of resources, even though tribal 
authority is partially contested by nationalist assertion.50 The dominance of tribal structures over 
the distribution of patronage resources forces us to rethink the politician-party-bureaucrat 
relationship that drives much of the electoral convergence in other areas.  
The exceptional nature of administration and the overwhelming influence of patronage 
distribution by tribal leaders has meant that there is a significant social and political distance 
between them and elected representatives and political parties. Most will avoid overtly 
supporting national parties, because parties have strictly limited influence over the distribution of 
resources from the central state; they gain little strategic benefit in allying with them. Resources 
flow from the office of the President, through the politically insulated Ministry of States and 
Frontier Regions (SAFRON), the FATA Secretariat, and then to political agents and tribal 
leaders directly. Tribal leaders and their followers are, in effect, taking the place of bureaucrats at 
the local level. These channels of patronage almost completely bypass parliament, political 
parties and elected politicians; they are executed and maintained by administratively exceptional 
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corners of the Pakistani state, politically sustained to this point by the tribes, the military and the 
higher echelons of federal administration. Given this context, party affiliation cannot provide 
access to exclusive patronage goods in these areas, which means that many candidates – party-
affiliated or not – can remain viable in these elections.51  
Those running for office in FATA, and to some extent in Balochistan, are sometimes 
tribal leaders seeking to demonstrate their strength of their following within the wider 
community, but are as often those at some remove from the tribal elite. Many of these candidates 
represent aspirants for greater power and influence but are relatively excluded from the higher 
echelons of tribal leadership, such as those who might have grown wealthy through 
transportation or trade or through investments or employment abroad.52 Individual tribal leaders 
might run or choose to support a certain candidate as a proxy, or these candidates have built up 
independent – though very local – bases of support, but these candidates are unlikely to have 
cross-constituency appeal. Successful candidates can simply rely on resources due to them as 
elected officials – in Pakistan, all parliamentarians receive discretionary development funds – 
and doing favors for friends in the capital to reward their smaller and more concentrated base of 
support, without needing to control larger flows of distribution from the state. Their access to 
political power also enable them to participate in other rent-seeking activities that have helped 
some to accumulate personal resources and in turn reward their supporters: “FATA Senators and 
MNAs use their position to get benefits to themselves… they have looked beyond the agency, 
they are national and global players.”53  
Individual contests bear this out. The electoral outcome in NA-45, in western Khyber 
Agency, reflected a contest of leadership between rival factions. Noor ul Haq Qadri, a tribal 
leader and the MNA elected in the 2008 elections was defeated by Shah Ji Gul Afridi, “once a 
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follower and right-hand man of Qadri,” after tribesmen from the Khyber Pass town of Landikotal 
urged him to challenge the leader.54 In NA-36, which covers Mohmand Agency, Malik Bilal 
Rehman, running as an independent candidate, won in 2008 and 2013 with 20 and 23 percent of 
the vote respectively. Bilal Rehman and his brother Hilal, a senator for FATA, “present 
themselves as the ‘real’ Maliks [leaders] of their tribe,” the powerful Halemzai clan, and their 
father and grandfather represented the Agency in parliament in the 1980s, continuing a long 
tradition of the family’s representation of the tribe to the state. In 2013, he was opposed by his 
uncle, Fazal Hadi, and his cousin, Malik Daud Shah, who ran on the PTI ticket, as an ultimately 
failed attempt to use an external electoral mandate to change the balance in internal clan 
politics.55 Thus, we see electoral contests testing the influence of individuals rather than the 
strength of parties, and as a result, independent candidates are viable in these elections. 
Numerous candidates can thus stay in the race, because they face no serious disincentives or 
clear signals that they would be assured of failure.  
Voters, faced with a more diverse array of possible candidates and without any clear 
signals like party affiliation about which is the most likely to deliver on their promises, are 
unable to reach any consensus on the two or three most likely candidates to win. As a result, their 
votes might accrue to their tribal patron or their proxy, or to a local champion, on the expectation 
that resources might be directed towards their locality. As a result, the vote is fragmented and we 
see a number of candidates, including independents and representatives of small parties, 
receiving significant numbers of votes. Major parties are thus prevented from monopolizing 
electoral contests. 
We see the resulting electoral fragmentation in a number of different dimensions. First, 
the effective number of candidates is significantly higher. In the 2013 elections, average “ENP” 
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for FATA constituencies and for Baloch constituencies (excluding Quetta) the average was 6.2 
and 4.5 respectively; for other constituencies, the average ENP was 2.87. Second, electoral 
competition could enable a higher number of serious independent candidates or those affiliated 
to very local parties. Political parties were first allowed to campaign in the Tribal Agencies in 
2011, so we focus on the 2013 election. The total vote-share for independent candidates in 
FATA constituencies and in Baloch constituencies outside Quetta was .578 and .217 
respectively, in contrast to .108 for other constituencies. Further, the vote share of parties of 
national standing is generally lower. The vote-share of parties of national standing in FATA and 
Balochistan excluding Quetta was .360 and .339 respectively, in contrast to .793 for all others. In 
these areas, most of the vote goes to candidates running either fully independently or unaffiliated 
with major national or regional political parties. 
 Lastly, because of the fragmentation of the vote and support from particular tribal leaders 
or communities within the district, we would expect that even the winning candidate would 
derive most of his support from a particular locality. Voting booth level data can provide 
circumstantial evidence of this dynamic. Any election is the aggregate results of support for 
various candidates in the different precincts. We would normally see that any one candidate’s 
performance would vary over the different polling booths, but extreme variation could indicate 
that even successful candidates are drawing significant support only from certain polling booths, 
representing particular localities. Figure 2 represents the aggregated difference between the 
winning candidate’s average across the constituency and their performance at each polling booth 
in eight FATA constituencies (Khyber I and II, Bajaur I and II, North Waziristan, Khurram, 
Orakzai, and Mohmand), one Baloch constituency (Zhob-Killa Abdullah-Sherani) and an urban 
and a rural constituency selected at random from Punjab (Lahore XI and Mianwali I) in the 2008 
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elections. The FATA and Punjab groups have roughly 600 polling booths each; the Baloch 
constituency contains 200.  
 
Figure 2: Difference between winner’s overall and polling-booth vote proportion over eleven 
constituencies, 2008 elections. 
 
Source: Pakistan Election Commission 
 
We see substantially greater variation in polling booth level outcomes in FATA and Baloch 
constituencies, signifying that when candidates win these seats, they do so with extensive 
support from a concentrated group of polling booths – and thus localities within the constituency 
– and almost no support in others. 
Broadly, the difference in the distributional power of the bureaucracy at the local level, 
and its impact on the practice of patronage, has clear implications for the conduct of electoral 
competition and the extent of party system convergence to national norms. Votes are fragmented 
when the bureaucracy cannot direct patronage resources, and thus national party affiliation does 
not drive electoral convergence. In the next section, we test the power of this argument relative 
to other explanations of variation in the number of parties.  
 
Empirical Analysis 
In order to test the effects of these governance institutions in relation to other factors, we fit 
models for the effective number of parties56 (ENP) for national assembly constituencies using 
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data from the 2008 and 2013 elections and the proportion of vote share of parties of national 
standing57 (PNS) in the 2013 elections. In the analysis below, we use two binary variables for 
constituencies under some form of subcontracted governance – FATA and Balochistan 
(excluding Quetta) – to assess the impact of subcontracted governance institutions mentioned 
above. The effects of FATA and Balochistan are assessed separately because the nature and 
functioning of these institutions, as well as the social context, are quite different. 
To control for alternative explanations, we use the following variables: 
Ethnic Diversity: Ethnic diversity is measured using a continuous variable for district-level 
measures for ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF) – from 0.858 as the most diverse to 0 as the 
most homogenous, derived from Census Reports. We would expect that higher ELF scores 
would yield higher ENP and lower PNS, all else equal, as voters are less likely to converge on 
candidates across ethnic lines.  
Urban Politics: Electoral mobilization in urban areas in Pakistan is quite distinct from the 
majority of the population in rural areas. Party offices, affiliated student and professional 
organizations, clubs and mobilizing rallies are more present; we would expect that these more 
institutionalized aspects of party organization would lead to lower ENP and higher PNS. We use 
a binary variable urban, coded 1 for constituencies representing municipal corporation wards of 
the cities in Pakistan above one million inhabitants: Karachi, Lahore, Faisalabad, Rawalpindi, 
Islamabad, Peshawar and Sarghoda; we include Quetta because it is the only large city in 
Balochistan. All other constituencies are coded 0.  
In addition, we employ the following control variables: 
Distance: we utilize distance in hundreds of kilometers between district administrative 
headquarters to the provincial capital, or in the case of FATA, Islamabad, as a proxy for how 
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linked voters are to major national and provincial issues, and therefore the localization of 
national contests. We would expect that more proximate administrative jurisdictions would have 
lower ENP and higher PNS.58 
HDI: we use the UNDP’s human development index by administrative district as a proxy for 
modernization, development and wealth. We would expect that voters in more developed 
districts to vote more strategically and parties to compete more actively as there are greater 
expectations on behalf of citizens for the distribution of goods, thus leading to lower ENP and 
higher PNS. 
Minister: we utilize a binary variable indicating whether the successful candidate was included in 
the federal cabinet after that election; this would be associated with lower ENP and higher PNS, 
as party grandees standing for office directly are more assured of control over patronage 
distribution, all else equal. 
Log_Incidents: During the past decade, Pakistan has experienced intense insurgent violence, 
which might have had an impact on how citizens view the state. We use the BFRS Political 
Violence in Pakistan dataset on the log numbers of incidents at the district level between 2002 
and 2007 and between 2008 and 2011 control for the effects of political violence.59 
Provincial Effects: We use binary variables for Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Sindh, with Punjab as 
the excluded category, to capture provincial effects for areas not under sub-contracted 
governance. 
We estimate two models for ENP, one each for the 2008 and the 2013 elections, and one model 
for PNS in the 2013 elections, using OLS regressions with Huber-White robust standard errors, 
clustered by administrative district.  
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Results 
 
 
Table 1: The Effect of Subcontracted, ELF and Urban Politics on ENP in the 2008 Elections, and 
ENP and PNS on 2013 Elections 
 ENP 
2008 
Robust 
SE 
ENP 
2013 
Robust SE PNS 
2013 
Robust 
SE 
FATA 1.78** 0.64 3.26*** 0.69 -0.20* 0.09 
Balochistan  0.61* 0.28 1.62** 0.54 -0.38*** 0.07 
       
Urban -0.47*** 0.13 -0.55** 0.11 0.04 0.04 
ELF 0.26 0.27 0.82 0.47 0.07 0.09 
Distance -0.03 0.03 0.69 0.59 -0.01 0.01 
HDI -0.70 1.05 -1.21 1.76 0.91** 0.28 
Minister -0.17 0.12 -0.52** 0.19 0.10** 0.04 
Log_incidents 0.08 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.02 
Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa 
0.68*** 0.18 1.25*** 0.26 0.11* 0.04 
Sindh -0.94*** 0.11 -0.48*** 0.18 -0.06 0.04 
Constant 3.09*** 0.60 3.45*** 0.95 .30 0.16 
 R2 0.46  0.51  0.43  
N 269  267  267  
Significance: * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
 
In these models, both urban and the subcontracted governance variables are statistically 
significant for ENP. FATA constituencies are, all else equal, associated with an increase in the 
difference of nearly two effective parties in 2008 and of more than three parties in 2013 
compared with other constituencies. For Baloch constituencies, the effect is more modest: they 
are associated with more than half a party in 2008 and more and one and a half in 2013.60 Urban 
constituencies are, all else equal, associated with a decrease of more than a half of an effective 
party compared to non-urban constituencies in both models. Other significant results on ENP 
include the provincial proxies for Sindh and KP, and Minister in 2013. All of these results 
conform to our expectations. The statistical and substantive significance of Sindh, all else equal, 
suggests the electoral dominance of MQM in Karachi and Hyderabad. For KP, the volatile party 
system at the provincial level, with the Islamist parties, the ANP and then the PTI rapidly 
	   25	  
succeeding one another may have led to a failure of strategic voting given the uncertainty of 
which party would be the ultimate victor. 
FATA and particularly Balochistan is strongly and negatively associated with PNS, all 
other things being equal: these constituencies are associated with a 20 percent and 38 percent 
lower vote share for parties of national standing. Human development is positively associated 
with greater PNS, though with a modest substantive effect. This is expected as those districts that 
are more integrated into plans for national development are more likely to vote for national 
parties. The KP provincial dummy has a positive effect; constituencies in the province are 
associated with an 11 percent higher PNS vote-share, lending some credence to the idea that KP 
politics reflects fragmented competition between major parties, rather than the lack of 
penetration of national politics into constituency-wise competition.  
 In sum, we find that subcontracted governance arrangements, in FATA and Balochistan, 
has a powerful effect on fragmenting representation at the constituency level and limiting cross-
district coordination, even controlling for other explanations. We argue that the specific nature of 
this exceptional governance, and particularly the means by which the state distributes patronage 
resources through tribal structures, are behind these results, rather than simply the lack of state 
capacity in these areas.61 Further, we believe that these results do not arise simply from coercion 
of local leaders subverting democratic elections.62 Thus while some of the indicators of party-
institutional development seem to correlate with electoral convergence, there remains substantial 
variation from this norm associated with particular political geographies.  
Electoral Fragmentation in India 
 
This relationship might even be present in older, institutionalized democracies in the developing 
world, such as India, in which there is less formal administrative exceptionalism. While 
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Chhibber and Kollman report that the average ENP for Indian constituencies approximated the 
Duvergerian equilibrium,63 there is a significant minority of districts, particularly in the North of 
the country, where this is not the case.64 In investigating these aberrant cases through survey 
research, a tentative association between the absence of the everyday state and electoral 
fragmentation has emerged. In a national survey conducted in 2002 by the Center for the Study 
of Developing Societies in Delhi, interviewers were asked to report whether the primary 
sampling unit, the polling station with an average population of about one thousand, was 
geographically proximate to any agency of the provincial or the central government, such as a 
police station or a post office. The presence of this agency within the polling station jurisdiction 
suggests the potential for the local distribution of patronage and its capture by politicians; 
localities without such agencies might develop alternative channels through which resources may 
be distributed, and are thus less susceptible to party-affiliated political influence.  
We obtained the average number of parties for each of the parliamentary constituencies, a 
total of 51, within which a particular polling station is located. We see significant variation in the 
proportion of localities with fewer state agencies across these constituencies. This is the case 
even in Delhi, the center of state power and thus a hard case for variation. In the Janakpuri 
constituency, half of the polling stations did not have a single agency of the state within its 
vicinity, whereas in the Malviya Nagar constituency, also in Delhi, all the polling stations have at 
least one state agency nearby. In that survey, respondents were also asked if there was a 
dominant caste in the area. We use a positive response to this question as a proxy for the 
presence of traditional authority.65 We find that polling station jurisdictions with one or more 
agencies of the state were correlated with significantly lower number of parties at the 
constituency level. Given that localities of state presence and absence are not uniformly 
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distributed across constituencies, this suggests that constituencies with a higher proportion of 
localities with fewer state agencies are associated with greater electoral fragmentation. The 
presence of a dominant caste at polling station level was associated with only a slight increase of 
the average number of parties for the associated constituencies, suggesting that it is the absence 
of state institutions, rather than the presence of traditional authority, that might influence 
fragmentation. This result was robust to the controlling for political knowledge – whether a 
respondent could identify Member of the State Assembly or the Member of Parliament from the 
area – and media exposure.66 
 
Table 2: ENP associated with polling booths by state presence and traditional authority 
  Coefficient SE 
Traditional Authority 0.05* 0.016 
Presence of State 
Agencies 
-0.267* 0.015 
Media Exposure 
Political Knowledge 
-0.03* 
0.012 
0.004 
0.01 
  
R2            0.05 
N            5822 
/     Significance: p<0.05  
Source: CSDS National Election Survey, India, 2002.  
 
The fact that we see tentative evidence for a correlation between local state absence and 
electoral fragmentation in India lends some credence to the external validity of the argument 
beyond the administrative exceptionalisms of the Pakistani periphery. At independence, India 
homogenized governance, at least in de jure terms throughout its territory, with frontier agencies, 
princely states and chieftaincies reorganized into states, districts, tehsils and other layers of local 
governance. Yet there is significant variation in the de facto presence of the administrative state 
throughout India’s political geography; in areas where channels of patronage distribution might 
not be completely controlled by bureaucrats, electoral fragmentation may occur because 
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powerful national or regional parties cannot claim total control over this distribution. Much more 
research is required to understand the dynamics in the Indian context, and to see how far this 
argument travels beyond South Asia. Other factors – from administrative decentralization to 
presidential systems to legacies of authoritarian rule to the nature of customary authority at the 
local level – may complicate a simple application of this argument further afield. Yet we believe 
that the nature of the administrative state at the local level and its related ability to monopolize 
the distribution of public goods serve as important and hitherto ignored conceptual tools in the 
study of electoral politics.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The extant literature on electoral politics has generally ignored variations in the administrative 
state at the local level and electoral coordination at the constituency level. Most scholars have 
assumed Duverger’s ‘local bipartyism’ to be in operation in elections under SMP rules. This 
article both highlights the failures of this assumption in parts of the Pakistani periphery, and 
suggests an explanation for why coordination succeeds in some contexts and fails in others. In 
particular, we focus on whether the quotidian bureaucracy maintains a monopoly over the 
distribution of patronage. If this is the case, candidates must gain leverage over bureaucrats in 
the distribution of patronage through affiliation with parties of national standing, thus 
establishing an exclusive arena of competition among major parties. When the bureaucracy does 
not maintain such a monopoly, however, the pressures for electoral coordination are absent, and 
thus fragmentation of the vote at the constituency level is much more likely as local champions 
are able to credibly compete for office. 
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